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ABSTRACT 
Manuscript type: Empirical 
Research question/issue: We examine whether the presence of women on the remuneration 
committee has an influence on say-on-pay voting.  
Research findings/insights: Based on panel data from the UK’s FTSE 350 firms from 2003 
to 2015, we find that firms with women on the remuneration committee reduce shareholders’ 
dissent via say-on-pay. However, only firms with a critical mass of more than 30% women 
on this committee are more likely to have less shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay (i.e. the 
presence of 30% women or less on this committee is not sufficient). 
Theoretical/academic implications: Our results provide empirical evidence that the gender 
diversity of directors on the remuneration committee plays a significant role in shaping 
shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay in the UK. Our results also provide empirical support for 
some of the previous studies that draw on critical mass theory that imply that women are 
more effective monitors when they make up a critical mass of more than 30%.  
Practitioner/policy implications: Our results could provide regulators with evidence in 
favour of improving women’s representation on UK remuneration committees. In addition, 
our results could help shareholders and nomination committee members understand the 
importance of having women on UK remuneration committees, as they are more likely to 
avoid suboptimal pay and align directors’ remuneration packages more closely with 
shareholders’ expectations. Finally, our results could also attract the attention of main 
stakeholders and the media, especially given their increasing attention both to gender 
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INTRODUCTION 
Gender diversity on boards has gained tremendous attention from policymakers, institutional 
investors and academics. Policymakers believe that women are under-represented on 
corporate boards (Adams, 2016; Adams et al., 2015; Terjesen, Aguilera & Lorenz, 2015) and 
that women are facing many challenges hindering them to access corporate boards (Gabaldon 
et al., 2016). Therefore, they have issued regulations to improve female representation on 
corporate boards (Terjesen, Aguilera & Lorenz, 2015). Some of these regulations have been 
in the form of mandatory quotas (for example, in Norway and France), and others in the form 
of soft recommendations (for example, in the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States 
(US)). Additionally, in the 1990s some institutional investors already promoted the idea of 
having more women on corporate boards, but several institutional investors have recently 
increased their actions targeting firms whose boards have little gender diversity (Marquardt & 
Wiedman, 2015) with the aim of enhancing their female representation on corporate boards 
(Kumar & Zattoni, 2016). Women’s representation in the boardroom has seen some 
improvement in recent years.  However, previous empirical studies about the economic 
benefits of board gender diversity on firm outcomes (including firm performance) are still 
limited or their results are unclear, and so scholars have called for more studies to better 
understand this area  (see for example Kirsch, 2017; Sila, Gonzalez & Hagendorff, 2016). 
Coherently, Kumar and Zattoni (2016) stated, ‘more research is needed to better understand 
the characteristics of female directors, the interests they represent, the contribution they 
provide to board and to firm performance, and so on’. This paper contributes to this debate by 
investigating whether gender diversity on the remuneration committee is associated with 
greater shareholder satisfaction via say-on-pay voting.  
Recent financial crises and scandals have created public anger and unrest regarding 
remuneration packages which have led to calls for the reform of remuneration policies. The 
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UK was the first country to introduce a mandatory non-binding shareholder vote on the 
remuneration package in late 2002 (Stathopoulos & Voulgaris, 2015). This voting approach is 
known as the ‘say-on-pay’, a tool which can be used by shareholders to express dissent about 
the recommendations made in remuneration reports (Mallin, 2016; Mangen & Magnan, 
2012). Since then, many research studies have investigated the antecedents and the 
consequences of say-on-pay voting (for recent reviews see Stathopoulos & Voulgaris, 2015 
and Obermann & Velte, 2018). Among some of these antecedents that most affect 
shareholder dissent via say-on-pay voting are higher CEO remuneration, firm performance 
and firm size, and weak boardroom governance (Alissa, 2015; Conyon, 2016; Conyon & 
Sadler, 2010; Ferri & Maber, 2013; Gregory-Smith & Wright, 2014).  
In this paper, we focus on the effect of women on the remuneration committee as previous 
studies have shown women are more likely to be effective monitors (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003), more ethical (Cumming, Leung & Rui, 2015) and 
more likely to reduce information asymmetry (Abad et al., 2017; Srinidhi, Gul & Tsui, 2011). 
In addition, there are presently limited studies on the effect of women on the remuneration 
committee (Kirsch, 2017; Obermann & Velte, 2018). Coherently, scholars have called for 
additional studies on the role of women on the remuneration committee and then on executive 
remuneration, including CEO pay with the aim to understand if they help to avoid suboptimal 
pay, and hence reduce shareholders’ dissent (Kirsch, 2017; Filatotchev & Wright, 2017; 
Strobl, Rama & Mishra, 2016). In particular, we build on agency and critical mass theories 
with the aim to study if the presence of women or only of a critical mass of more than 30% 
women on the remuneration committee are more likely to decrease shareholder dissent voting 
on executive remuneration arrangements proposed by the management (i.e. say-on-pay). We 
believe that this research question is important both with respect to theorizing but also with 
respect to the measures used in analyses on say on pay.  
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We focus on the role of say on pay as a mechanism that aims to reduce agency problems and 
to promote the efficiency of corporate governance by providing an additional tool for 
shareholders’ interventions in firms’ governance via the “voice” channel rather than the 
“exit” channel (Hillman et al., 2011; Mangen & Magnan, 2012; Stathopoulos & Voulgaris, 
2015). Amongst the various corporate governance mechanisms that institutional investors 
may choose to utilise to engage with their investee companies, voting is considered the least 
costly for shareholders (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Moreover, voting gives the shareholders a 
means of conveying their disapproval on the proposed executive remuneration by voting 
against or abstaining (Goranova & Ryan, 2014). Whilst previous studies tend to show that 
shareholders vote with incumbent management (Armstrong, Gow & Larcker, 2013; Conyon 
& Sadler, 2010; Del Guercio & Hawkings, 1999, Listokin, 2010; Smith, 1996), in contrast to 
this a recent study by Sauerwald, Van Oosterhout & Van Essen, (2016) argues that 
shareholders’ dissent can be viewed as an effective corporate governance mechanism even 
though it may not affect the voting outcome directly. According to some studies, shareholders 
are publicly making known their views with their dissent voting indicating that they are not 
satisfied with the present management and thereby leading to a negative evaluation of firm’s 
corporate governance (Hillman et al., 2011; Sauerwald, Van Oosterhout & Van Essen, 2016). 
Coherently, previous studies identify several negative effects of dissenting shareholders on 
firm outcomes such as the decrease of firm value, the replacement of the CEO and of other 
board members and even the takeover of the firm in the long-term (for  recent reviews see 
Goranova & Ryan, 2014 and Obermann & Velte, 2018).  
 To avoid such negative consequences, previous studies on say-on-pay show, for example, 
that companies significantly change their remuneration practices to adhere to better corporate 
governance standards when criticized by their active shareholders via say-on-pay (Ferri & 
Malber, 2013). At the same time, previous studies show that boards do not appear to respond 
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to shareholder dissatisfaction systematically; however, they do respond selectively and 
swiftly (Alissa, 2015). Furthermore, previous studies identify not only outcomes at firm level 
but also several other outcomes that dissenting shareholders generate at investor and 
environmental level (for recent reviews see Goranova & Ryan, 2014 and Obermann & Velte, 
2018). 
 None of these previous studies has investigated the associations between gender diversity 
and say-on-pay voting. Following a few previous studies (Daily et al., 1998; Conyon & Peck, 
1998), we focus on the characteristics of the remuneration (compensation) committee, as it 
makes the vast majority of decisions related to executive remuneration. First, we build on 
agency theory to posit that the greater the presence of women on the remuneration 
committee, the lower the proportion of shareholder dissent votes via say-on-pay. However, 
several studies on board diversity failed to show unanimously a clear positive effect of 
women on firm outcomes and thus highlight the need for additional studies on this topic (for 
a recent review see Kirsch, 2017). Among the possible explanations that might help to 
explain why, scholars draw on critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977) by arguing that this 
relationship may not be linear as a result of tokenism issues (i.e. the presence of women is 
normalized only if women make up a critical mass).  In our paper, we build on the critical 
mass theory and add to the literature by arguing that only firms with a critical mass of more 
than 30% women directors sitting on their remuneration committees are more likely to have 
less shareholders’ dissent votes via say-on-pay. 
We use a large sample of the UK’s FTSE 350 non-financial firms between 2003 and 2015 to 
test our two hypotheses which our results support. The first hypothesis aims to test whether 
the presence of women on the remuneration committee reduces shareholders’ dissent via say-
on-pay and the second hypothesis aims to study whether only firms with a critical mass of 
more than 30% women on the remuneration committee are more likely to have less 
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shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay. Our results also hold after controlling for endogeneity 
concerns (Antonakis et al., 2014; Wintoki, Linck & Netter, 2012). 
Overall, the paper aims to contribute both to the stream of literature on women on boards and 
key sub-committees and to the stream of literature on shareholder dissent voting via say-on-
pay as it provides new insights into the role of women on the remuneration committee, and to 
their impact on shareholder dissent votes. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: 
Section 2 discusses the institutional background. Section 3 outlines the theoretical 
background and hypotheses development, Section 4 explains the data and methods, Section 5 
reports the results of the study, Sections 6 and 7 provide a discussion and conclusions 
respectively. 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
In recent years two high profile areas of corporate governance are executive remuneration 
and board diversity, specifically the use of say-on-pay in the former and gender diversity in 
the latter. This paper brings together these two aspects with the UK having led developments 
in both these areas. On the one hand, the UK follows a self-regulatory (soft-law) corporate 
governance enforcement (comply or explain approach). In 2002, the UK was the first country 
to introduce legislation requiring all UK quoted companies to grant their shareholders an 
advisory and non-binding vote on executive remuneration (known as the say-on-pay). After 
concerns emerged that an advisory shareholder vote on the remuneration report was not 
enough, the UK Department of Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS, 2013) 
recommended that remuneration policy should be subject to a binding shareholder vote and 
should state the directors’ projected remuneration for the coming three years.  
On the other hand, after many concerns about the slow progress of gender diversity in the 
UK’s publicly listed firms, the UK government assigned Lord Davies of Abersoch to 
commence an independent review (Davies Report, 2011) of the current number and position 
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of female directors on UK corporate boards. Specifically, the aim of the review was to 
identify obstacles that prevented women from reaching the boardroom and make 
recommendations for the government and FTSE 350 firms about what they should do to 
increase female representation in boardrooms (Davies Report, 2011).  
The Davies Report (2011) recommended that FTSE 100 firms should achieve at least 25% 
female representation on their boards by 2015. Subsequent Davies Reports (2012, 2013, 2014 
and 2015) reviewed the progress of implementing the Davies Report (2011) 
recommendations regarding female representation on UK corporate boards. For example, the 
Davies Report (2015) showed that FTSE 100 boards were ‘well on (the) way to achieving the 
25% target’ by the end of 2015, and more specifically, FTSE 100 boards achieved 23.5% 
female representation in 2015. In addition, it showed that women on UK boards are 
experienced but are not over-committed and recruitment consultants are widely used by 
nomination committees in the UK in order to help with the recruitment of women with a good 
profile over time. More recently, the Hampton-Alexander Review (2016) was a continuation 
of the previous work of the Davies Reports to enhance the role of women in UK boardrooms. 
One of its recommendations was that all FTSE 100 companies should aim to have at least 
33% female representation on their boards by 2020, including their executive teams. 
Regarding the evolution of the appointment of women on UK boards, a recent study on 
gender diversity on European boards (EWOB, 2016) - that examines the participation of 
women directors on the boards and key sub-committees at STOXX 600 companies over the 
period spanning 2011-2015 - shows that the level of women board memberships on UK 
boards increased over time but it is still below the European average. However, the UK has 
seen the greatest improvement in terms of reducing all-male boards. In addition, the 
percentage of women on audit and remuneration committees rank above the respective 
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European averages. Finally, the disclosure about the appointment of new directors is very 
good in the UK compared to other EU countries.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The board of directors plays a critical role in mitigating agency problems (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory has been used frequently, alone or in 
combination with other theories, by scholars to investigate whether women directors help 
boards and sub-committees in monitoring the managers of the firm (see for example Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003; for recent reviews see Kirsch, 2017 and 
Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009).  
A large literature supports the co-existence of the "nature" and "nurture" perspectives and 
argues that these two perspectives are complementary when it comes to explaining 
differences and similarities between women and men (for a recent review see Eagly & Wood, 
2013). In addition, a recent study by Ryan (2017, p. 771) finds that "distinctions between the 
sexes that may have previously been presumed to be due to “nurture” may now also be 
demonstrably related to “nature”. Coherently, a common view among scholars is that women 
and men are both natured and nurtured differently throughout their lives (Ashcraft, 2005; Ely 
& Padavic, 2007; Eagly & Wood, 2013; Zanoni et al., 2009). In particular, the “nature” 
perspective refers to innate biological structures and processes (biology explains all gender 
differences), whereas the “nurture” perspective refers to sociocultural influences (women and 
men are socialized in distinct ways) (Eagly & Wood, 2013). From the “nature” perspective, 
scholars argue that women and men behave differently as, for example, their brain structure 
and hormones that activate behaviours are different (Wood & Eagly, 2012). While from the 
“nurture” perspective, scholars argue that women and men behave differently as cultural 
differences (for example via unconscious biases, norms and stereotypes) and socialization 
(for example via parental socialization, peer group, teachers, and children’s social context) 
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affect the behaviour of women and men during their life differently (see Ashcraft, 2005; Ely 
& Padavic, 2007; Eagly & Wood, 2013; Zanoni et al., 2009). In this vein, previous studies 
show that women and men are socialized in distinct ways, starting in early childhood (for 
example, boys and girls grow up seeing a world populated by male political and business 
leaders, which tells these children something about who they can and cannot be, as well as 
who they should and should not be). Moreover, women are surrounded by adults, notably 
teachers and parents, who are biased against their intellectual abilities (Gunderson et al. 2012; 
Lavy & Sand 2018; Riegle-Crumb & Humphries 2012). A large literature in organizational 
studies points out how socialization continues in adulthood, as organizations deal differently 
with women and men in a number of ways (Ashcraft 2005; Zanoni et al. 2009; Ely & Padavic 
2007). To sum up, both nature and nurture stories offer understandings of gender and 
organizations that complement one another (Eagly & Wood, 2013). Given that a common 
view is that women and men are different, the appointment of women directors should make 
the composition of boards more diverse, which is thought to affect board effectiveness, and 
by extension, firm outcomes. Research in corporate governance argues that women directors 
improve monitoring for several reasons (for recent reviews see Kirsch, 2017, Terjesen, 
Aguilera & Lorenz, 2015 and Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009). For example, women on 
boards are more likely than male directors to be independent directors and are thus more 
effective monitors (Adams, 2016; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 
2003).  
First, it has been argued that women are more independent as they are not beholden to a 
group think mentality that might accompany an old-boys-network (Adams, 2016). Second, 
women are more diligent than men that help to improve monitoring (Kirsch, 2017). In 
particular, several papers show that women are more ethical, risk-adverse, more prepared and 
long-term oriented than men (Cumming, Leung & Rui, 2015; Franke, Crown & Spake, 1997; 
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Pan & Sparks, 2012). For example, Pan and Sparks (2012) contend that women directors are 
firmer than male directors when it comes to implementing moral standards on the board. 
Furthermore, women directors are more likely to consider dubious business transactions 
unethical (Franke, Crown & Spake, 1997). Cumming, Leung & Rui (2015) also find that 
women directors are less likely to commit fraud. Women directors are also stronger when it 
comes to implementing their fiduciary duties (Post & Byron, 2015).  
Additionally, women directors have been found to come to meetings better prepared than 
their male counterparts (Huse & Solberg, 2006). Moreover, women usually spend more time 
considering decisions than men and this might help to reduce negative consequences for 
multiple stakeholders (Hillman, 2015). Here the main assumption is that women use both 
sides of their brain when making decisions, suggesting that decisions made by women entail 
a broader consideration of implications for multiple stakeholders (Eagly, Wood & Diekman, 
2000; Tavris, 1993). Men use only one side, and this is the reason why the decision making 
by men may be quicker, but it may be also more singularly focussed (Tavris, 1993). Third, 
several papers argue that the presence of women offers diversity of opinion that changes the 
boardroom dynamics (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 2003). Gender 
diverse-boards also tend to produce good-quality decisions due to their different cognitive 
frames (Hillman, 2015; Post & Byron, 2015). 
Furthermore, a few recent studies show that women can increase the effectiveness of board 
sub-committees. Among them, Srinidhi, Gul & Tsui (2011) find that firms with more women 
on audit committees exhibit higher earnings quality which increases investor confidence in 
firms’ financial statements. Similarly, Thiruvadi & Huang (2011) reveal that the presence of 
women on audit committees helps their firms to lower discretionary accruals.  
Given that both the nature and nurture perspectives provide evidence in support of the 
existence of gender differences and that previous studies show that the presence of women  
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on board and key sub-committees increases monitoring, we assume that firms with more 
women on remuneration committees will be more likely to have less shareholders’ dissent via 
say-on-pay.  
Shareholders’ dissent on say-on-pay is usually measured as the total number of shareholders’ 
against votes on the remuneration report divided by the total number of votes cast (Conyon & 
Sadler, 2010). In particular, say on pay votes offer shareholders an opportunity to provide 
positive or negative feedback directed to executive directors about the appropriateness of 
their remuneration arrangements (Conyon, 2016; Mallin, 2016). Among the reasons for 
voting against the remuneration report, there might be concerns about remuneration 
arrangements (such as over generous arrangements, poor performance linkage, undue 
ratcheting up of pay, pay arrangements being focussed too much on the short term, multiple 
application of the same performance target, concerns about various components of 
remuneration, including inappropriate discretionary payments, generous pension 
arrangements, too much vesting at threshold or median performance) and concerns about the 
level of disclosure in the AGM notice about remuneration reports (such as poor disclosure 
and the lack of retrospective disclosure on bonus awards). 
Shareholders’ dissent on the remuneration report is usually considered a relatively “low-cost” 
opportunity for shareholders to provide negative feedback on executive remuneration to 
directors on a regular basis. Negative feedback is a signal of weak corporate governance in a 
firm and suboptimal pay (Conyon, 2016, Mangen & Magnan, 2012) and can be associated 
with several negative consequences, including negative abnormal returns, that decrease 
shareholder value (Obermann & Velte, 2018). More recently, scholars argue that CEO power, 
boardroom information problems (including groupthink and a status quo preference due to 
boardroom homogeneity) and conflicts of interest between stakeholders and influential 
shareholders in pay setting can lead to suboptimal pay and increase executive pay problems. 
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In this vein, “say on pay may not only fail to remedy suboptimal pay but also legitimize it” 
(Mangen & Magnan, 2012, p.1).  
Consistent with this view, prior research has shown that boardroom gender diversity can help 
to mitigate these concerns. On the one hand, previous studies show that gender diversity on 
boards has a positive relationship with the proportion of executive directors’ remuneration 
linked to company performance such as equity-based pay (Adams & Ferreira, 2009, Lucas-
Pérez et al, 2015) and that women on remuneration committees decrease the chances of 
extremely high executive remuneration, lead to lower CEO pay and reduce excess CEO 
remuneration (Bugejia, Matolcsy & Spiropoulos, 2015 and Usman et al., 2018). On the other 
hand, previous studies show that a negative relation exists between disclosure quality and 
information asymmetry (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Heflin, Shaw & Wild, 2005) and that 
women on boards reduce information asymmetry by increasing the quantity and quality of 
information (Abad at al., 2017; Nalikka, 2009; Srinidhi, Gul & Tsui , 2011), by promoting 
more effective board communications to investors (Joy, 2008) and by engaging in activities 
that reduce information asymmetry (Upadhyay & Zeng, 2014). In addition, previous studies 
show that firms with more women on boards encourage more effective communication 
between the board and its stakeholders (Terjesen, Sealy & Singh, 2009) and that women 
directors are better listeners than male directors, more likely to raise tough questions on 
remuneration matters and more willing ‘to put someone’s welfare before their own’ (Konrad, 
Kramer & Erkut, 2008).  
Therefore, we posit that if an increase in the presence of women on remuneration committees 
encourages more effective monitoring and decreases concerns about executive remuneration 
arrangements, for example both by increasing the proportion of executive directors’ 
remuneration linked to company performance and by reducing excess CEO remuneration, 
and reducing information asymmetry by increasing the level of disclosure and board 
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communications to investors, then shareholders are then more likely to be satisfied with the 
remuneration reports and hence there will be less shareholder dissent and they are more likely 
to vote in favour of remuneration reports via say-on-pay. 
Hypothesis 1. An increase in the presence of women on the remuneration committee is 
associated with a reduction in the proportion of shareholder dissent votes via say-on-pay.  
 
Several studies on board diversity based on the critical mass theory contend that, until women 
or men in a group reach a certain threshold, they are more likely to be marginalised (Joecks, 
Pull & Vetter, 2013; Kanter, 1977; Konrad, Kramer & Erkut, 2008; Torchia, Calabrò & Huse, 
2011). Kanter (1977) first developed the critical mass theory. She argued that women or men 
minorities within a large, more dominating group tend to be marginalised or seen as tokens. 
Due to their lower numbers, minorities begin to seem untrustworthy to the larger, more 
dominating group which, in turn, reduces their power in decision making as the focus of the 
group members is only on the different genders and stereotyping (Kanter, 1977). However, 
this tokenism perception towards minorities diminishes when the number of minorities grows 
to a certain threshold (i.e. critical mass).  
At this point, the minorities are no longer seen as tokens, more trust is gained, and their 
influence on decision making and firm’s outcomes increases as the focus of the group 
members is not on the different genders and stereotyping but now on the different skills and 
abilities that women carry in the group (Konrad, Kramer & Erkut, 2008; Liu, Wei & Xie, 
2014). According to Kanter (1977), a critical mass of women consists of 20-40% women.  In 
the context of a corporation’s governance, a number of recent studies show that only a critical 
mass of more than 30% women directors on boards that translates into an absolute value of 
about three women on boards increases firm outcomes (Ahmed et al, 2017; Dahlerup, 2006 
&1988; Joecks, Pull & Vetter, 2013; Liu, Wei & Xie, 2014; Torchia, Calabrò & Huse, 2011). 
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Coherently, we posit that only a critical mass of more than 30% women directors on the 
remuneration committee may have an impact on say-on-pay dissent voting.  
If the presence of 30% women directors or less on the remuneration committee largely 
dominated by male directors may have no impact on say-on-pay dissent voting, we argue that 
only when a critical mass of more than 30% women directors sit on the remuneration 
committee, women may have more influence in decision making as they are not seen as 
tokens or nor their views ignored by the male dominated group. Therefore, the combination 
of female and male attributes will more likely increase group discussion, reduce information 
asymmetry and will increase the performance of the remuneration committee. Coherently, the 
more acceptable to shareholders the remuneration policy and then the lower the shareholders’ 
dissent votes via say-on-pay. Therefore, we posit the following: 
Hypothesis 2. The presence of women forming a critical mass of more than 30% on the 
remuneration committee is associated with a reduction in the proportion of shareholder 
dissent votes via say-on-pay.  
DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
This paper uses unbalanced panel data from the UK’s FTSE 3501 non-financial firms2 over 
the period spanning from 2003–2015. After excluding financial firms and firms with missing 
voting data, our final sample comprised 2,935 firm-year observations. Data on shareholder 
voting on executive remuneration were obtained from Manifest Information Services Ltd. 
Data on remuneration committee characteristics (such as the number of women, the size of 
the remuneration committee and the proportion of independent non-executive directors), 
CEO remuneration, board size and other board characteristics were collected from the 
BoardEx database. Institutional ownership data were obtained from the Thomson Reuters 
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Eikon database, whilst financial data (such as total sales, return on assets and stock returns) 
came from the Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
Model  
We use the following panel data model to investigate the impact of the presence of women on 
remuneration committees on shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2−17𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡                                         (1) 
The dependent variable in model (1) is the say-on-pay dissent voting (Dissent), which is 
measured as the total number of shareholders’ against votes on the remuneration report 
divided by the total number of votes cast (Conyon & Sadler, 2010). Following Conyon 
(2016), we performed a logistic transformation to Dissent in the above model and then 
estimate using OLS. The OLS estimator alone, without performing the logistic transformation 
to Dissent, is inappropriate, as it predicts probabilities outside the range of zero to one 




). An alternative way to overcome the aforementioned problem is to use the 
logistic model of the generalised linear model. Therefore, we created another measure for the 
shareholder dissent vote following Gregory-Smith, Thompson & Wright (2014) and used a 
cut-off of 10% dissent. Therefore, we define Dissent in the above model as an indicator 
variable of 1 if the dissent voting is greater than 10% (Dissent > 10%), 0 otherwise. 
The main independent variables in our model are about the ratio of women directors on 
remuneration committees. Women are measured as the total number of women directors on 
the remuneration committee divided by the remuneration committee’s size. In addition, we 
build on Kanter (1977) and a number of recent studies on women on boards that show that 
only a critical mass of more than 30% women directors on boards increases firm outcomes 
(Ahmed et al, 2017; Dahlerup, 2006 & 1988; Joecks, Pull & Vetter, 2013; Liu, Wei & Xie, 
2014; Torchia, Calabrò & Huse, 2011). Coherently, we generated several dummies to study 
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the impact of the critical mass of more than 30% women on the remuneration committee. 
Hence, Women<20 % is an indicator variable of 1 if the remuneration committee has at least 
one woman up to 20% women, 0 otherwise. 20%<Women<30% is an indicator variable of 1 
if a remuneration committee has a proportion of women in the remuneration committee that is  
more than 20% up to 30%, 0 otherwise. Women >30% is an indicator variable of 1 if the 
proportion of women on the remuneration committee is more than 30%, 0 otherwise. 
Additionally, our model uses a set of control variables, including CEO remuneration, 
corporate board and remuneration committee characteristics and firm characteristics. Log 
CEO pay is defined as a natural log of the total CEO remuneration, which is the sum of cash 
remuneration and equity-linked pay. As for remuneration committee characteristics, woman 
as remuneration committee chairperson is measured as an indicator of 1 if a woman is the 
chair of the remuneration committee, 0 otherwise. Remuneration committee size is defined as 
the total number of directors on the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee 
independence is calculated by the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
remuneration committee.  
Corporate board controls include women on boards, board size, board independence and CEO 
duality and CEO tenure. Women on boards are the proportion of women from the total board 
size. Board size is measured by the total number of directors on the board, and board 
independence is measured as the proportion of independent non-executive directors on the 
board. CEO duality is measured by an indicator variable of 1 if the CEO is both the CEO and 
Chair of the firm, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural logarithm of the number of 
years a CEO has served on the board. These corporate governance controls have been widely 
used by previous studies (Alissa, 2015; Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Ferri & Maber, 2013).  
Firm characteristic controls include firm size, firm performance and institutional ownership. 
We have included a natural log of the firms’ total sales as a proxy for firm size (Alissa, 2015; 
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Conyon, 2016; Ferri & Maber, 2013; Gregory-Smith, Thompson & Wright, 2014). 
Additionally, we have included two financial performance measures: one is an accounting 
measure of the return on assets (ROA), and the other is a market measure of the stock return 
(stock appreciation plus dividends). These two measures have been widely used by some 
prior studies (Alissa, 2015; Carter & Zamora, 2009 Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Ferri & Maber, 
2013). Additionally, we include market-to-book value (MBV) to control for future expected 
financial performance (Sauerwald, Van Oosterhout & Van Essen, 2016). The MBV is 
measured as the average equity market value divided by the total book value of equity. 
Institutional ownership is measured as the percentage of shares held by institutional investors 
holding more than 3% of the firm’s equity (Alissa, 2015; Conyon, 2016; Ferri & Maber, 
2013).  
We also use leverage and price volatility to control for firms’ risk (Conyon & Sadler, 2010; 
Ferri & Maber, 2013). Leverage is defined as total debts divided by total assets, and the price 
volatility is measured as a share’s average annual price movement to a high and low from a 
mean price for each year. Moreover, we account for specific time events during the study 
period, including post-2007 (to control for the impact of the financial crisis), post-2010 (to 
control for the impact of the UK Stewardship Code), post-2011 (to control for the impact of 
the UK Davies Report) and post-2013 (to control for the impact of the UK say-on-pay 
mandatory and binding voting). Finally, our regression model contains another two control 
dummy variables: year and industry. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 shows the overall summary of the patterns of the main variables of the FTSE 350 
non-financial firms from 2003 to 2015 (2,935 firm-year observations) by year and industry. 
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Appendix A presents frequency/additional data for key variables - over 38% of our sample 
firms have no women on the board whilst over half have no women on the remuneration 
committee. The majority (74.81%) of remuneration committees have four or fewer members 
in total. Descriptive statistics and Pearson’s correlation matrix are provided in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
Table 1 shows the summary by year and indicates that the level of shareholders’ dissent on 
the remuneration report continued to be low over the sample period. In particular, about 
5.77% of investors tended to vote against the remuneration reports over the sample period. 
This is consistent with previous studies in the UK, such as those of Alissa (2015) and Conyon 
& Sadler (2010). Moreover, 16.6% of firms received more than 10% shareholders’ dissent on 
the remuneration report via say-on-pay voting during the sample period. The dissent level 
was slightly higher than average in 2003, but it went down to a level below 5% until 2007. 
Again, in 2008, the dissent level showed an apparent increase until 2015. In terms of 
remuneration committee and board characteristics, women directors represented 14.9% of the 
total number of directors on the remuneration committee, whereas at the board level, women 
directors had a mean of 10.4% for the entire period.  
Regarding the proportion of women on the remuneration committees, firms without any 
woman account for 51.47% of the total sample, firms with at least 1 woman but no more than 
20 % women account for 2.59% of the total sample, firms with a proportion of women more 
than 20% up to 30% account for 34.59% of the total sample, whereas firms with more than 
30% women account for 11.35%. The remuneration committee size is around four members, 
whereas the board size is about nine members. The average percentage of independent non-
executive directors on the board and the remuneration committee is about 56% and 94%, 
respectively. Additionally, 13% of the firms tend to combine the posts of CEO and Chair. 
The total average CEO pay is approximately £2.557 million. The presence of women on the 
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board and the remuneration committee saw a steady increase until 2011 and a sharp increase 
from 2012 until 2015. In addition, Table 1 reports the overall summary of the patterns of the 
main variables across different industries. The oil and gas industry has the highest percentage 
of shareholders’ dissent votes on executive remuneration, whereas the utility industries have 
the lowest percentage of dissent votes. Female directors are more concentrated in the utilities 
industries.  
Table 2 shows the difference between firms with low shareholder dissent voting and firms 
with high shareholder dissent voting. Firms with low dissent voting tend to have more 
women on their remuneration committees, more institutional ownership, lower CEO pay, a 
smaller board size and less CEO duality. Table 3 shows the correlation matrix that indicates 
no severe multicollinearity problems. We also compute the variance inflation factors (VIFs) 
of independent variables for each regression; all values are below a recommended threshold 
value of five. Overall, multicollinearity is not a problem in our analyses. 
Regression Results 
Table 4 contains the results for the regression explaining the shareholders’ dissent via say-on-
pay voting.  
Our results show that there is a significant negative relationship between the presence of 
women on the remuneration committee and say-on-pay dissent voting for both the OLS 
model where we use the ‘log dissent’ (β = -0.668, t = -2.62) and the logit model where we use 
the ‘dissent>10’ (β = -1.275, t = -2.66). Consistent with results from previous studies (Alissa, 
2015; Carter & Zamora, 2009; Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Ferri & Maber, 2013; Gregory-
Smith, Thompson & Wright, 2014), our results show that shareholders’ dissent is 
significantly higher in firms with higher CEO remuneration. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is 
supported, which backs our assumption that the presence of women directors on the 
remuneration committee aligns the executives’ remuneration with shareholders’ interests. 
 
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Hence, shareholders are more likely to be satisfied. In Models (3-4), instead of year dummies, 
we control for different time events captured during the study period, including the financial 
crisis (2007), the Stewardship Code (2010), the Davies Report (2011) and the say-on-pay 
mandatory and binding voting (2013). The results remain unchanged.  
Regarding control variables, we find that institutional ownership, board size and 
remuneration committee size have mixed results in relation to dissent votes. CEO duality is 
positively associated with a higher number of shareholders’ dissent votes. Previous studies 
such as Conyon (2016) and Sauerwald, Van Oosterhout & Van Essen (2016) have shown that 
CEO duality leads to more shareholders’ dissent. In addition, the log of net sales has mixed 
results with shareholders’ dissent votes. Firm performance (as measured by ROA) has a 
marginal significant negative relationship with higher dissent votes under the logit model, but 
not under the OLS model. Firm risk (as measured by price volatility) is positively associated 
with higher dissent votes. 
We further investigate whether only firms with a critical mass of more than 30% women on 
the remuneration committee are more likely to have less shareholders’ dissent (Hypothesis 2). 
We differentiate between firms that have at least one woman up to 20% women, firms with a 
proportion of women more than 20% up to 30% and firms that have more than 30% women 
on their remuneration committees (see Table 5 for a summary of the results). Models (1-2) of 
Table 5 show that only firms with a critical mass of more than 30% women on their 
remuneration committees have a significant relationship with shareholders’ dissent for both 
‘log dissent’ and ‘dissent>10’ (β = -0.468, t = -3.43 and β = -0.803, t = -3.02, respectively). 
Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported, which backs the view that low representation of women on 
the remuneration committee largely dominated by male directors have no impact on say-on-
pay dissent voting, as they might be not trusted, may be marginalised or seen as a token. To 
sum up, our results show that only firms with a critical mass of more than 30% women on 
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their remuneration committee are more likely to improve remuneration policy and to reduce 
shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay. 
Endogeneity Our main hypothesis is that women may be seen as effective monitors as they 
improve remuneration arrangements and decrease information asymmetry, and thereby, 
shareholders are more likely to be satisfied with remuneration reports if women are present 
on remuneration committees. While our results so far support this hypothesis, one could 
argue that the jump from causation to causality is premature and that the interpretation of our 
results suffers from endogeneity concerns, including unobserved heterogeneity (time-varying 
unobservable effects either due to omitted variables such as shareholders’ engagement behind 
the scenes or macro-level shocks), simultaneity and selection bias (Antonakis et al., 2014; 
Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). An alternative explanation can account for the results (i.e. the 
“good governance” story): firms with better governance and fewer agency problems are more 
likely to appoint women to their remuneration committees, and, at the same time, are also 
more likely to design compensation plans that shareholders are more satisfied with. In other 
words, women tend to join the boards of firms that receive lower dissent voting or/and firms 
with good corporate governance and firm characteristics. For now, it is unclear whether 
gender differences on remuneration committees are causing the governance differences (as 
our paper claims) or whether governance differences are causing the gender differences on 
remuneration committees (as the “good governance” story suggests).  
In order to tease out what is causing what, first we attempt to control for causality by 
analyzing the determinants of women’s appointment on boards and remuneration committees 
using three estimators: the OLS, the fixed-effect (FE) and the probit model. Following 
previous studies, we have used several control variables used in the main analysis (see for 
example Marquardt & Wiedman, 2016; Sila, Gonzalez & Hagendorff, 2016; Terjesen, 
Aguilera & Lorenz, 2015). On the one hand, Table 6 shows that there is no evidence that 
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past3 shareholder dissent voting affects the presence of women on boards (Models 1, 2 & 3) 
and on remuneration committees (Models 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9). On the other hand, Table 6 shows 
that women directors are more likely to join boards of firms that have a larger firm size, 
larger board size, higher board independence and better performance. In addition, it shows 
that women directors are more likely to be on the remuneration committees of firms that 
already have a higher proportion of women on boards, longer CEO tenure and better 
performance. Overall, our results confirm the results of previous studies that show that 
governance and firm’s characteristics affect the appointment of women on boards and on 
remuneration committees in the UK (Gregory-Smith, Main & O’Reilly III, 2014)4 . 
i. Two-step GMM  
The relationship between the representation of women on remuneration committees and say-
on-pay dissent voting may be endogenous due to unobserved heterogeneity (time-varying 
unobservable effects either due to omitted variables or macro-level shocks) and simultaneity 
(see for example the “good governance” story mentioned previously). According to Abad et 
al. (2017), the OLS has shortcomings in that it cannot solve the problems of the unobserved 
heterogeneity and the simultaneity (where the dependent and independent variables are 
combined in simultaneous explanation; for example, it can be argued either that women cause 
low dissent or that low dissent attracts more women). Therefore, we use the two-step GMM 
estimator as it has been commonly used to control for endogeneity problems (see for example 
Abad et al., 2017) and as it has been commonly recognised to be superior to the other 
estimators to control for the endogeneity using panel data (for further details see for example 
Cameron & Trivedi, 2005; Roodman, 2009; Wintoki at al., 2012). In particular, the two-step 
GMM estimation overcomes the endogeneity bias by estimating a system of two 
simultaneous equations (Abad et al., 2017). Our assumption in the GMM is that all the 
independent and control variables used in our main models except the year dummy variables 
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are endogenous. Coherently, the first equation uses all variables used in our main models 
except the year dummy variables in levels (first differences instruments) and the other uses 
these variables in first differences (lagged with respect to instruments). 
Tables 7 and 8 present the results of the two-step GMM. The results show that the 
relationship between women on remuneration committees and say-on-pay dissent voting is 
still significant which supports our previous findings. Tables 7 and 8 also report the results of 
specification tests for the validity of the two-step GMM estimation procedure. If the 
assumptions of the specification are valid, then residuals in first differences (AR(1)) should 
be correlated, but there should be no serial correlation in second differences (AR(2)). Results 
of these tests confirm that this is indeed the case. The Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions and the autocorrelation also shows that our two-step GMM specification tests are 
valid. The values of the Wald test indicate the importance of the joint significance of the 
instruments in explaining the variations in the dependent variable. Overall, the evidence 
reported in Tables 7 and 8 supports our predictions, once we use the GMM estimator to 
account for endogeneity concerns. In addition, the evidence reported in Table 8 shows that 
only firms with a critical mass of 30%women are more likely to improve remuneration policy 
and to reduce shareholders’ dissent via say-on-pay for both ‘log dissent’ (β = -0.537, t = -
3.05) and ‘dissent>10’ (β = -0.108, t = -2.27). 
ii. Propensity score matching 
The two-step GMM is superior in controlling the unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity 
problems, but not the problem of selection bias (Wintoki at al., 2012). In this context, it may 
be that other covariates affect the appointment of women directors on the board and then on 
the remuneration committee (i.e. women tend to self-select the board(s) that they want to join 
based on firms’ characteristics and good corporate governance). Thus, we use propensity 
score matching (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983; Guo & Fraser, 2015) that helps to mitigate 
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concerns about selection bias by matching firms in the control group (e.g., remuneration 
committees without women) and firms with the treatment group (e.g., remuneration 
committees with women) but with otherwise similar observable characteristics. In other 
words, after matching, differences in shareholders’ dissent could be attributed to whether or 
not women are appointed on remuneration committees, rather than to differences in the other 
covariates.  
We run the propensity score matching using the psmatch2 command in Stata. In particular, 
we match firms with (treatment group) and without (control group) gender diverse 
remuneration committees by using the single nearest neighbour algorithm (1- NN) with a 
common support and a caliper of 0.01 (and with no replacement) using all board and firm 
characteristics included in our previous estimations.  
Specifically, we use a procedure consisting of the following steps. First, we run a logistic 
propensity score model which estimates the probability that a firm will have a gender diverse 
remuneration committee conditional on the observable governance and firm characteristics 
included in our main previous models. Second, we identify matched pairs with the smallest 
propensity score differences. More specifically, we identify the firms with non-gender diverse 
remuneration committees whose propensity score is close to the firms with gender diverse 
remuneration committees but with otherwise similar characteristics. Third, we omit 
unmatched pairs if the difference in the propensity scores is greater than 0.1%. After we 
match, our probability models meet the balancing property required for propensity score 
matching and reduce the absolute bias that after matching is below the target of 5%5. Table 9 
shows the average treatment effect (ATT) results for propensity score matching models.  
We find that the difference in the shareholders’ dissent voting outcomes is statistically 
significant for both Log dissent and Dissent > 10%. Overall, these results are consistent with 
our previous findings. 
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iii. Further tests 
We also examine the robustness of our main results to different sub-time samples, including 
pre- and post- Davies Report (2011) and pre- and post- say-on-pay mandatory and binding 
voting (2013), to control for the effect of regulatory changes relating to women on boards and 
say on pay respectively. The results of these tests are reported in Table 10. We only report 
key variables for brevity, but all models include every control variable used in previous tests. 
We found that the presence of women on remuneration committees exerts a negative impact 
on shareholders’ dissent voting pre- and post- the Davies Report (2011) (see Panel A of Table 
10), however; this negative relationship becomes more significant post-the Davies Report 
(2011). This may indicate that the impact of women directors on say-on-pay voting may be 
contingent upon time and different types of pressures and procedures the governance bodies 
are performing. Specifically, this may suggest that pre-Davies Report (2011) women were 
under-represented on boards and on remuneration committees and that after the publication of 
the Davies Report (2011), the number of women on boards increased dramatically. 
Alternatively, the number of women on boards and on remuneration committees may not 
have changed significantly after the Davies report, but women on boards on remuneration 
committees may have had more power in influencing compensation setting. This may suggest 
that women on boards and key sub-committees after the Davies report have had more 
confidence in understanding their role and hence more power in influencing firms’ practices, 
including remuneration policy. In Panel B, we test the impact of gender diverse remuneration 
committees on say-on-pay dissent voting pre- and post- say-on-pay mandatory and binding 
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DISCUSSION   
This paper extends the current literature by examining whether gender diversity on 
remuneration committees has an effect on say-on-pay voting. Overall, our study has practical 
implications in that greater board gender diversity not only supports fairness, but also seems 
to have potential economic benefits in relation to executive remuneration. Specifically, we 
show the importance of the presence of women on the board and, more particularly, on the 
remuneration committee. Given that executive remuneration is an especially contentious area 
and the focus of shareholder and media attention, our findings indicate that the presence of 
more women directors on a remuneration committee seems to align executive remuneration 
more closely with shareholders’ expectations and there is less shareholder dissent via say-on-
pay voting.  
Recently, Green and Homroy (2018) demonstrate the economic significance of the proportion 
of women on boards and key subcommittees in the largest European firms. Overall, they find 
that firms benefit from female directors only when they sit on sub-committees. Coherently, 
the evidence of the relationship between women on UK remuneration committees and say-
on-pay voting should make the presence of women on remuneration committees more 
desirable to both practitioners and policymakers. Therefore, UK regulators should enhance 
gender diversity on remuneration committees with the aim to increase the diversity on this 
sub-committee to a critical mass of more than 30% women. Some firms may have diversified 
boards but may not use that diversity to its full potential benefit. For example, women 
directors may be under-represented on remuneration committees. Therefore, the UK 
Corporate Governance Code should recommend that female representation is improved in 
remuneration committee membership at least to a critical mass of more than 30% women. 
Regarding the optimal gender quota, several differences exist around the world and it is not 
the aim of this study to contribute to the literature about the best gender quota on the board, 
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the remuneration committee or other sub-committees. In general, we suggest favouring 
diversity of opinion as we do not advocate remuneration committees composed only of 
women or of men (i.e. uniform remuneration committees in which all members are of the 
same gender). In addition, to avoid box ticking, policymakers could not only issue soft law 
recommendations in relation to gender diversity but also, they could go deeper by scrutinising 
and possibly regulating the recruitment process of directors to the board and its remuneration 
committees as boardroom heterogeneity can be beneficial during pay setting (Mangen & 
Magnan, 2012). Furthermore, other mechanisms might be in place such as the presence of 
active shareholders, the presence of external advisors and even the media coverage that might 
favour the adoption of good corporate governance practices that might work as substitute or 
complementary mechanisms to the role of women on boards and key sub-committees. Future 
studies can provide further evidence on the interplay between these mechanisms. 
Our study has some limitations; we use aggregated shareholders’ voting data instead of 
individual shareholders’ voting data due to the lack of availability of these data. Investigating 
shareholder heterogeneity may explain differences in voting decisions, for example, the 
variations in voting decisions between pension funds and hedge funds. Therefore, future 
studies could examine whether the relationship between say-on-pay dissent voting and 
women directors on remuneration committees will change by the type of investor. We do not 
analyse whether gender diverse boards and firms with more women on the remuneration 
committee have better performance and this is an area that could be investigated in future 
studies. Moreover, our study is limited to the UK. However, the characteristics of women on 
corporate boards vary across countries and governance systems, and therefore, it is important 
to understand the relationship between the presence of female directors on remuneration 
committees and how the effects of shareholder dissent via say-on-pay voting impacts other 
countries. Our study has examined determinants of the say-on-pay dissent voting when 
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women directors are present on remuneration committees. Future studies could also 
investigate the response of female directors on remuneration committees following high 
shareholders’ dissent voting and whether their response leads to changes in executives’ 
remuneration.  
Future studies could conduct cross-sectional analysis that decomposes firms into groups with 
high and low executives’ remuneration. Future research might also consider examining 
different remuneration characteristics as shareholders may not be concerned about the level 
of total pay but may be concerned about the composition or the form of payment (e.g., the 
proportion of stock-based remuneration and the pay gap between the CEO and other 
executives) or about the performance elements (e.g. financial versus non-financial key 
performance indicators).  
Moreover, our argument assumes that all shareholders actively engage with their investee 
companies’ remuneration reports. In other words, they read the remuneration report, and fully 
understand its contents. However, we cannot be sure that this is the case. Specifically, our 
argument cannot measure whether low shareholder dissent voting suggests shareholders who 
do not care to read the remuneration reports, or to vote on them. Also, our argument cannot 
investigate if low shareholder dissent voting reveals shareholders who follow the voting 
recommendations of compensation consultants, or institutional investors. Additionally, our 
argument cannot predict whether the shareholders who do not vote on remuneration reports 
are, for example, institutional investors, and they may do this as they have business ties with 
their investee firms. All these limitations can offer valuable research potential for future 
studies. Furthermore, our argument cannot predict which women’s attributes are good and 
which attributes are risky, to boards and remuneration committees. Thus, our study cannot 
generalise that all female directors are active directors and beneficial to the firm whilst all 
male directors are detrimental to appoint to the board. We suggest that future studies could 
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focus on positive and negative attributes of women and/or of men on boards and key sub-
committees.  
In addition, we agree that there are differences among board directors in terms of power; 
powerful directors are typically the more influential on boards and on remuneration 
committees than less powerful directors. In our paper, following previous studies (Alissa, 
2015; Conyon & Sadler, 2010; Ferri & Maber, 2013) we have controlled for CEO power 
using CEO duality and log CEO tenure. However, due to the research design of this study and 
data availability, we were not able to control for other power differences among board 
members.  
Referring to some previous studies (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter, Simkins & Simpson, 
2003), we base our argument that most women directors are seen as out-group members and 
more independent than male. However, by definition women can be or become part of an in-
group. Previous studies show that differences exist across countries due to cultural bias, 
firms’ characteristics and different gender quota regulations. We recommend future studies to 
investigate the determinants of women directors either as in-group versus out-group members 
and their evolution over time in this regard.  
Furthermore future studies could further investigate this topic by using a different research 
design with the aim to shift the attention from votes on executive directors' remuneration 
packages to the processes that lead to the (re)design of (optimal versus suboptimal) executive 
directors' remuneration packages. For example, future studies could investigate the actions of 
the remuneration committee members at their meetings by analyzing minutes from 
remuneration committee meetings (for an example see Schwartz-Ziv, 2017) and by using 
interviews with remuneration committee members' and/or shareholders. 
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Finally, while we tried to mitigate concerns about reverse causality, unobserved 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, selection bias and the impact of several related regulations using 
a number of robustness tests, as usual with such studies a word of caution is needed.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper examines whether the presence of women directors on remuneration committees 
has an influence on say-on-pay voting. Based on a sample from the UK’s FTSE 350 firms 
from 2003 to 2015, our results indicate that firms with more women on their remuneration 
committee attract less dissent via say-on-pay voting, suggesting that women play an 
important role in monitoring the content of remuneration reports and helping to align these 
reports with the interests of shareholders. Additionally, we find that only in firms which have 
a critical mass of more than 30% women on the remuneration committee is there a significant 
negative impact on shareholders’ dissent. To account for endogeneity, we further estimate the 
previous analysis using two-system GMM and propensity score matching respectively. The 
two-system and post-matching results show that our previous findings about women on 
remuneration committees and say-on-pay dissent voting remain unchanged. 
 
NOTES 
                                                 
1 The FTSE 350 index includes the largest companies in the UK and represents approximately 97% of the UK’s market 
capitalisation. 
2 Financial firms are heavily regulated and have different financial reporting formats. In addition, financial firms are known 
for their high executive remuneration. Thus, we exclude them as they may skew the results (Bugeja, Matolcsy & 
Spiropoulos, 2015). 
3 Past say-on-pay dissent voting is measured as the average of shareholder dissent between year one (t-1) and year five (t-5). 
The idea behind measuring say-on-pay dissent voting over a longer period is to avoid outliers within a shorter period that is 
not reflective of firms’ corporate governance.  
4 Our data are at firm level and not at individual level; therefore this study cannot determine if there is gender selection bias 
in appointments to boards and key sub-committees. A recent study by Gregory-Smith, Main and O’Reilly III (2014) using a 
sample of UK FTSE350 companies between 1996 and 2011 shows that the appointment of women as non-executive 
directors are not gender neutral which means that the probability to appoint a female as a non-executive director is lower 
than the probability to appoint a man. 
5 The covariate balance tables are not reported here. Available upon request.  
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Table 1 Summary of sample by year and industry (%) 
 No. of resolutions 
on remuneration 
report 
% dissent on 
remuneration 
report 






No. women on 
remuneration 
committees 






% women on 
boards  
Panel A: summary by year        
2003 178 6.26 19.66 3.87 0.32 7.97 0.039 5.2 















2007 232 3.54 9.48 3.9 0.47 11.60 0.099 7.77 








































Total 2935 5.77 16.61 3.93 0.61 14.90 
0.114 
10.4 
Panel A: summary by industry   
Basic Materials  245 6.08 18.03 3.74 0.34 7.80 0.090 6.96 
Industrials  830 4.68 13.13 3.94 0.52 12.30 0.095 7.78 
Health Care 149 6 15.44 3.94 0.71 17.60 0.114 13.8 
Oil & Gas 183 9 25.68 3.83 0.45 10.30 0.093 7.39 
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Consumer Services 870 6.46 19.54 3.81 0.74 19.00 0.129 12.7 
Consumer Goods 177 5.94 18.08 3.94 0.48 12.40 0.124 6.91 
Technology 311 5.4 15.76 4.32 0.74 16.10 0.087 13.2 
Telecommunication 57 6.06 14.04 4.11 0.72 16.30 0.193 13.7 
Utilities 113 2.81 4.42 4.2 0.86 21.10 0.248 15.7 
Total 2935 5.77 16.61 3.93 0.61 14.90 0.114 10.4 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
 All firms Firms with low shareholder dissent voting Firms with high shareholder dissent voting 
 Mean Median SD Min Max N Mean Median SD Min Max N Mean Median SD Min Max N 
Log dissent  -3.81 -3.79 1.69 -9.21 0.996 2913 -4.3 -4.06 1.37 -9.21 -2.21 2395 -1.33 -1.46 0.669 -2.21 1.37 518 
Dissent >10% 16.6 0 37.2 0 1 2934 0 0 0 0 0 2416 0.992 1 0.0876 0 1 518 
Women % 14.9 0 17.3 0 75 2934 15.1 0 17.6 0 75 2416 13.8 0 15.9 0 66.7 518 
Women<20% 0.0259 0 0.159 0 1 2934 0.0248 0 0.156 0 1 2416 0.0311 0 0.174 0 1 514 
20%<Women<30% 0.346 0 0.476 0 1 2934 0.344 0 0.475 0 1 2416 0.354 0 0.479 0 1 514 
Women>30% 0.113 0 0.317 0 1 2934 0.118 0 0.323 0 1 2416 0.0914 0 0.289 0 1 514 
Women on board % 10.40 10 10.29 0 57.14 2934 10.40 10 10.30 0 57.1 2416 10.40 10.6 10.1 0 50 518 
Remuneration committee 
chairperson = woman  
0.111 0 0.314 0 1 2934 
0.118 0 0.323 0 1 2416 0.0965 0 0.296 0 1 518 
Log CEO pay) 7.41 7.39 0.897 3.76 11.10 2930 7.36 7.35 0.864 3.76 11.10 2416 7.64 7.62 1.01 4.30 10.90 514 
Institutional ownership % 35.6 34.1 20.7 0 99.7 2907 35.8 34.4 20.8 0 99.7 2392 34.9 33.1 20.2 0 95 515 
Board size 9.06 9 2.37 5 18 2921 9.04 9 2.32 5 18 2404 9.19 9 2.58 5 17 517 
Remuneration committee size 3.93 4 1.05 2 9 2930 3.93 4 1.02 2 9 2416 3.98 4 1.21 2 9 518 
Board independence % 55.7 57.1 13.5 0 92.9 2934 55.2 55.6 13.5 0 92.9 2416 58 60 13.1 0 86.7 518 
Remuneration committee 
independence % 
94.4 100 13.1 25 100 2925 
94.4 100 13.2 25 100 2408 94.4 100 12.4 25 100 517 
CEO duality 0.13 0 0.337 0 1 2934 0.125 0 0.33 0 1 2416 0.156 0 0.364 0 1 518 
Log CEO tenure 1.17 1.34 1.11 -2.3 3.67 2892 1.18 1.34 1.11 -2.3 3.67 2391 1.12 1.28 1.11 -2.3 3.39 501 
Log total sales 14.2 14.1 1.52 8.41 19.7 2914 14.2 14.1 1.5 8.85 19.7 2404 14.3 14.2 1.62 8.41 19.6 510 
MBV 3.73 2.61 11.6 -114 198 2896 3.54 2.63 10.4 -114 195 2385 4.62 2.58 16 -111 198 511 
Stock return % 15.9 11.7 46 -96.7 410 2929 15.6 12.2 43.3 -96.7 398 2413 16.8 9.23 56.9 -92.4 410 516 
ROA % 6.4 5.8 8.6 -67 79 2922 6.57 5.88 8.3 -61.6 79 2405 5.61 5.26 9.75 -67.2 58.9 517 
Leverage % 23.1 22.3 16.8 0 96.4 2921 23.2 22.3 17 0 96.4 2405 22.4 22.2 15.9 0 82 516 
Price volatility % 27.8 26.3 8.87 11.5 62.4 2542 23.2 22.3 17 0 96.4 2405 29.2 27.1 10.4 12.3 59.9 445 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 
otherwise. Women is proportion of women from total remuneration committee size.  Women<20 % is an indicator variable of 1 if the remuneration committee has at least one woman up to 20% women, 0 otherwise. 20%<Women<30% is 
an indicator variable of 1 if a remuneration committee has a proportion of women in the remuneration committee that is  more than 20% up to 30%, 0 otherwise. Women >30% is an indicator variable of 1 if the proportion of women 
on the remuneration committee is more than 30%, 0 otherwise. Women on board is proportion of women from total board size. Remuneration committee chairperson = woman is measured as an indicator of 1 if a woman is the chair of the 
remuneration committee, 0 otherwise. Log CEO pay is sum of natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding 
more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration 
committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality dummy is 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is the natural 
logarithm of the number of years a CEO has served on the board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix 
 1 2 3  4 5 6 7 8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19 20 21 20 21 
Log dissent 1                       
Dissent >10% 0.82* 1                      
Women% -0.02 -0.03 1                                
Women<20 % 0.036 0.011 0.49* 1                    
20<Women<30% -0.03 -0.03 0.59* -0.25 1                   
Women>30% -0.006 0.02 0.21* -0.08* -0.036 1                  
Women on boards% 0.025 0.003 0.737* 0.367* 0.47* 0.19* 0.08* 1                
Remuneration 
committee chairperson = 
woman 
-0.025 -0.027 0.361* 0.226* 0.21* -0.04* -0.01 0.283* 1               
Log CEO pay 0.13* 0.13* 0.11* 0.08* 0.06* 0.09* 0.02 0.189* 0.074* 1                       
Institutional ownership -0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01* -0.07* -0.03 -0.054* 0.033 -0.23* 1                      
Board size 0.05* 0.02 0.05* 0.07* 0.04* 0.07* 0.03 0.159* -0.036 0.36* -0.39* 1            
Remuneration 
committee size 
0.02 0.01 0.14* 0.09* 0.25* 0.23* 0.11* 0.231* 0.061* 0.17* -0.07* 0.29* 1           
Board independence 0.09* 0.08* 0.22* 0.16* 0.12* 0.07* 0.03 0.316* 0.085* 0.21* -0.02 0.05* 0.26* 1          
Remuneration 
committee independence 
-0.01 -0.00 0.07* 0.05* 0.004 0.04* 0.01 0.021 -0.03 -0.04* 0.03 -0.07* -0.10* 0.37* 1         
CEO duality 0.01 0.03 -0.11* -0.09* -0.04* -0.04* -0.01 -0.165* -0.068* -0.08* -0.09* 0.01 -0.16* -0.25* -0.01 1        
Log CEO tenure -0.021 -0.018 0.0124 0.0187 0.003 0.03 -0.03 -0.0198 -0.0290  0.069* 0.070* 0.031 0.0096 -0.0790* 0.018 0.0001 1       
Log total sales 0.06* 0.02 0.19* 0.12* 0.13* 0.11* 0.02 0.297* 0.094* 0.38* -0.39* 0.53* 0.28* 0.34* 0.03 -0.12* -0.096* 1      
MBV 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.031 -0.008 0.05* -0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.079* -0.02 1     
Stock return 0.01 0.01 -0.06* -0.06* -0.03* -0.01 -0.01 -0.078* -0.03 0.02 0.09 -0.07* -0.07* -0.07* 0.01 0.03* 0.093* -0.11* 0.08* 1    
ROA -0.05* -0.04* -0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.010 0.018 -0.032 0.11* -0.08* -0.01 -0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.007 -0.09* 0.14* 0.07* 1   
Leverage -0.02 -0.02 0.04* -0.02 0.05* 0.03 0.038 0.065 -0.001 0.01 -0.09* 0.14* 0.06* 0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.075 0.20* 0.03 -0.11* -0.21* 1  
Price volatility 0.08* 0.08* -0.18* -0.11* -0.10* -0.10* -0.04 -0.251* -0.051* -0.21* 0.20* -0.21* -0.19* -0.12* 0.03 0.13* -0.027 -0.32* -0.04 0.16* -0.19* -0.16* 1 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women is proportion of women 
from total remuneration committee size. Women<20 % is an indicator variable of 1 if the remuneration committee has at least one woman up to 20% women, 0 otherwise. 20%<Women<30% is an indicator variable of 1 if a remuneration committee has a proportion of women in the 
remuneration committee that is more than 20% up to 30%, 0 otherwise. Women >30% is an indicator variable of 1 if the proportion of women on the remuneration committee is more than 30%, 0 otherwise. Women on board is proportion of women from total board size. Remuneration 
committee chairperson = woman is measured as an indicator of 1 if a woman is the chair of the remuneration committee, 0 otherwise. Log CEO pay is sum of natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Institutional ownership is proportion 
of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the 
remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality dummy is 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is natural logarithm of number of years a CEO 
serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to 
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Table 4 Impact of women directors on the remuneration committee on say-on-pay 
dissent voting 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 OLS Logit OLS Logit 
 Log dissent Dissent>10 Log dissent Dissent>10 
Women -0.668*** -1.275*** -0.686*** -1.256*** 
 (-2.62) (-2.66) (-2.67) (-2.61) 
Women on boards 0.480 0.637 0.397 0.597 
 (0.97) (0.73) (0.78) (0.67) 
Remuneration committee chair 
= women 
-0.199** -0.0997 -0.216** -0.118 
 (-1.98) (-0.51) (-2.15) (-0.61) 
Log CEO pay 0.628*** 0.572*** 0.584*** 0.536*** 
 (12.09) (5.79) (11.37) (5.52) 
Institutional ownership 0.155 -0.105 0.105 -0.168 
 (0.80) (-0.31) (0.54) (-0.50) 
Board size 0.00119 -0.0376 0.00702 -0.0359 
 (0.07) (-1.10) (0.40) (-1.07) 
Remuneration committee size 0.0161 0.0306 0.0216 0.0373 
 (0.52) (0.49) (0.70) (0.61) 
Board independence 0.662** 1.219** 0.548 1.090* 
 (1.97) (2.03) (1.62) (1.82) 
Remuneration committee 
independence 
-0.144 0.152 -0.0825 0.179 
 (-0.50) (0.29) (-0.28) (0.34) 
CEO duality 0.250** 0.493*** 0.265** 0.496*** 
 (2.31) (2.68) (2.44) (2.71) 
Log CEO tenure -0.0775** -0.0634 -0.0740** -0.0605 
 (-2.43) (-1.16) (-2.32) (-1.12) 
Log total sales 0.0169 -0.0892 0.0262 -0.0801 
 (0.50) (-1.48) (0.77) (-1.35) 
Stock return -0.143 -0.0636 -0.0964 -0.102 
 (-1.49) (-0.39) (-1.14) (-0.72) 
ROA -0.636 -1.799** -0.860* -1.919*** 
 (-1.41) (-2.47) (-1.90) (-2.60) 
MBV 0.000549 0.00535 0.00130 0.00569 
 (0.19) (1.15) (0.44) (1.17) 
Leverage 0.313 0.00150 0.305 0.0176 
 (1.39) (0.00) (1.34) (0.04) 
Price volatility  0.0132*** 0.0196** 0.0142*** 0.0203** 
 (2.72) (2.36) (2.90) (2.48) 
Post 2007   -0.0296 0.353** 
   (-0.33) (2.33) 
Post 2010   0.425*** 0.0758 
   (3.54) (0.36) 
Post 2011   -0.272** -0.0635 
   (-2.20) (-0.28) 
Post_2013   -0.0102 -0.00142 
   (-0.09) (-0.01) 
Year dummies Yes Yes No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -9.339*** -6.278*** -9.240*** -6.613*** 
 (-14.63) (-5.69) (-14.63) (-5.89) 
N 2409 2423 2409 2423 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.163 0.066 0.145 0.059 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit 
dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women is 
proportion of women from total remuneration committee size. Women on board is proportion of women from total board size. 
Remuneration committee chairperson = woman is measured as an indicator of 1 if a woman is the chair of the remuneration committee, 0 
otherwise. Log CEO pay is sum of natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. 
Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total 
number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration 
committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality dummy is 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 
otherwise. Log CEO tenure is natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. 
ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is 
average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's 
average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Post-2007 to control for the impact of the financial 
crisis. Post-2010 to control for the impact of the UK Stewardship Code. Post-2011 to control for the impact of the UK Davies Report. Post-
2013 to control for the impact of the UK say-on-pay mandatory and binding voting. Robust standard errors in parentheses (at firm level). 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 5 Critical mass of women directors on the remuneration committee and the 
impact on shareholders’ dissent voting 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 OLS Logit 
 Log dissent Dissent>10 
Women<20% -0.0759 -0.247 
 (-0.38) (-0.65) 
20<Women<30% -0.0557 -0.169 
 (-0.61) (-1.04) 
Women>30% -0.468*** -0.803*** 
 (-3.43) (-3.02) 
Women on boards 0.398 0.604 
 (0.78) (0.67) 
Remuneration committee chair = women -0.223** -0.107 
 (-2.15) (-0.54) 
Log CEO pay 0.588*** 0.538*** 
 (11.49) (5.59) 
Institutional ownership 0.0827 -0.193 
 (0.43) (-0.57) 
Board size 0.00289 -0.0416 
 (0.16) (-1.23) 
Remuneration committee size 0.0502 0.0891 
 (1.48) (1.29) 
Board independence 0.462 0.962 
 (1.36) (1.60) 
Remuneration committee independence -0.0455 0.216 
 (-0.16) (0.41) 
CEO duality 0.277** 0.515*** 
 (2.57) (2.83) 
Log CEO tenure -0.0755** -0.0614 
 (-2.37) (-1.15) 
Log total sales 0.0256 -0.0796 
 (0.75) (-1.33) 
Stock return -0.0951 -0.0982 
 (-1.13) (-0.69) 
ROA -0.838* -1.881** 
 (-1.88) (-2.54) 
MBV 0.00145 0.00581 
 (0.51) (1.22) 
Leverage 0.340 0.0638 
 (1.50) (0.16) 
Price volatility  0.0148*** 0.0213*** 
 (3.03) (2.59) 
Post 2007 -0.0377 0.345** 
 (-0.42) (2.27) 
Post 2010 0.427*** 0.0805 
 (3.56) (0.38) 
Post 2011 -0.269** -0.0607 
 (-2.18) (-0.27) 
Post 2013 0.000897 0.00194 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
Year dummies No No 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Constant -9.368*** -6.846*** 
 (-14.79) (-6.10) 
N 2409 2423 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.147 0.060 
Note that Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = 
ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women<20 % is an indicator 
variable of 1 if the remuneration committee has at least one woman up to 20% women, 0 otherwise. 20%<Women<30% is an indicator variable of 
1 if a remuneration committee has a proportion of women in the remuneration committee that is  more than 20%  up to 30%, 0 otherwise. Women 
>30% is an indicator variable of 1 if the proportion of women on the remuneration committee is more than 30%, 0 otherwise. Women on board is 
proportion of women from total board size. Remuneration committee chairperson = woman is measured as an indicator of 1 if a woman is the 
chair of the remuneration committee, 0 otherwise. Log CEO pay is sum of natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and 
equity linked remuneration. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s 
equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. 
Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of 
independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality dummy is 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 
otherwise. Log CEO tenure is natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is 
firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity 
market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price 
movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Post-2007 to control for the impact of the financial crisis. Post-2010 to control for 
the impact of the UK Stewardship Code. Post-2011 to control for the impact of the UK Davies Report. Post-2013 to control for the impact of the 
UK say-on-pay mandatory and binding voting. Robust standard errors in parentheses (at firm level). *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 6 Determinants of women directors on the board and on the remuneration 
committee 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) 
 OLS FE Probit OLS FE Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 Women on boards Women 
on boards 
dummy 










Log dissent t-5  -0.00366 -0.00304 -0.131 -0.00261 0.00504 -0.112 -0.160 -0.0565 0.0904 
 (-1.03) (-0.74) (-1.00) (-0.41) (0.69) (-0.93) (-0.94) (-0.53) (0.54) 
Women on boards t-1 0.805*** 0.532***  0.0299 -0.01000 0.644 -0.216 -0.246 3.342*** 
 (46.15) (24.30)  (0.72) (-0.15) (1.05) (-0.24) (-0.63) (5.62) 
Women on boards dummy t-1   2.723***       
   (24.32)       
Women on remuneration 
committees t-1                                            
   0.792*** 
 (37.78) 
0.588*** 
  (19.37) 
    
          
Women on remuneration 
committees dummy t-1 
     2.571*** 
      (24.32) 
   
          
Women<20% t-1       1.408***   
       (7.93)   
20<Women<30% t-1        1.961***  
        (29.29)  
Women>30% t-1         2.071*** 
         (15.37) 
Log CEO pay t-1    0.00244 -0.00347 0.136** 0.0870 0.0848* -0.00740 
    (0.81) (-0.74) (2.35) (0.93) (1.76) (-0.11) 
Institutional ownership t-1 0.00404 -0.0166 -0.00828 -0.00664 -0.0224 -0.0104 0.973*** -0.00953 0.00444 
 (0.74) (-1.60) (-0.04) (-0.65) (-1.15) (-0.05) (2.69) (-0.05) (0.02) 
Board size t-1 0.00142** 0.00173 0.0553** -0.00152 -0.000334 -0.0567*** -0.0473 0.00305 -0.0667** 
 (2.58) (1.57) (2.20) (-1.48) (-0.12) (-2.77) (-1.32) (0.18) (-2.54) 
Remuneration committee size t-1    -0.000371 -0.00386 0.00146 0.357*** -0.0535 0.110** 
    (-0.16) (-0.89) (0.03) (4.31) (-1.53) (2.30) 
Board independence t-1 0.0238** 0.0355* 0.913** 0.0493** 0.106** 0.476 -1.466** 0.771*** -0.283 
 (1.99) (1.95) (2.32) (2.14) (2.18) (1.17) (-2.06) (2.59) (-0.57) 
Remuneration committee 
independence t-1 
   0.00355 -0.0189 0.114 -0.668* 0.273 0.301 
    (0.22) (-0.68) (0.39) (-1.74) (1.02) (0.68) 
CEO duality t-1 -0.00698** -0.00943* -0.230* -0.00778 -0.0171 -0.122 -0.488* -0.0383 -0.0660 
 (-2.49) (-1.77) (-1.85) (-1.37) (-1.41) (-1.00) (-1.77) (-0.36) (-0.43) 
Log CEO tenure t-1 0.000803 -0.000227 0.0537 0.00435** 0.00387 0.0771** -0.0472 0.0544* 0.0406 
 (0.77) (-0.17) (1.39) (2.34) (1.46) (2.05) (-0.68) (1.77) (0.83) 
Log total sales t-1 0.00195** 0.00107 0.126*** 0.00209 -0.00167 0.0776** 0.233*** -0.000547 0.0952** 
 (2.14) (0.25) (2.97) (1.13) (-0.21) (1.98) (3.11) (-0.02) (2.22) 
Stock return t-1 0.000456 0.000754 0.0182 -0.000192 0.000879 -0.0278 -0.178 -0.112 0.0922 
 (0.21) (0.30) (0.20) (-0.04) (0.17) (-0.32) (-1.24) (-1.47) (0.85) 
ROA t-1 0.000526 -0.0122 0.154 -0.0353 -0.0414 -0.219 -1.410* 0.163 -0.816 
 (0.04) (-0.58) (0.27) (-1.38) (-0.98) (-0.46) (-1.66) (0.37) (-1.37) 
MBV t-1 -0.0000700 -0.0000275 0.00708** -0.000004 0.0000871 0.00294 0.00215 0.00391 -0.00446 
 (-1.05) (-0.33) (2.25) (-0.03) (0.41) (1.05) (0.66) (1.27) (-1.01) 
Leverage t-1 0.00440 0.00850 -0.203 0.00967 0.0361 0.0911 -0.0778 -0.166 0.289 
 (0.62) (0.59) (-0.78) (0.74) (1.25) (0.38) (-0.17) (-0.81) (0.95) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.0479*** 0.0631 -2.796*** -0.0419 0.165 -2.679*** -7.303*** -1.981*** -3.328*** 
 (-3.26) (1.01) (-4.07) (-1.25) (1.39) (-4.00) (-7.22) (-3.55) (-4.10) 
N 2447 2447 2447 2437 2437 2437 2437 2437 2437 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.767 0.607 0.669 0.707 0.527 0.601 0.389 0.380 0.501 
Note that Log dissent t-5 is measured as the average of shareholder dissent between year one (t-1) and year five (t-5). Women on board is proportion of women from total board 
size. Women on boards dummy is an indicator of 1 if the appointed director on board is a woman and 0 otherwise. Women is proportion of women from total remuneration 
committee size. Women on remuneration committees dummy is an indicator of 1 if the appointed director on remuneration committee is a woman and 0 otherwise. Women<20 % 
is an indicator variable of 1 if the remuneration committee has at least one woman up to 20% women, 0 otherwise. 20%<Women<30% is an indicator variable of 1 if a 
remuneration committee has a proportion of women in the remuneration committee that is more than  20%  up to 30%, 0 otherwise. Women >30% is an indicator variable of 1 if 
the proportion of women on the remuneration committee is more than 30% , 0 otherwise. Remuneration committee chairperson = woman is measured as an indicator of 1 if a 
woman is the chair of the remuneration committee, 0 otherwise. Log CEO pay is sum of natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked 
remuneration. Institutional ownership is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in 
the board. Board independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration 
committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality dummy is 1 if CEO combine the 
posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ 
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book 
value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock’s average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Post-2007 
to control for the impact of the financial crisis. Robust standard errors in parentheses (at firm level). All independent variables are lagged one year. 
*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 7 Women directors on the remuneration committee and the impact on 
shareholders’ dissent voting using two-step GMM 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 System GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM 
 Log dissent Dissent>10 % Log dissent Dissent>10 % 
Lag Log dissent  0.243***  0.0955  
 (5.78)  (0.56)  
Lag Dissent>10 %  0.114***  0.131*** 
  (3.04)  (3.63) 
Women -0.657** -0.174** -0.838** -0.179** 
 (-2.03) (-2.23) (-2.49) (-2.08) 
Women on boards 0.298 0.229 0.454 0.252 
 (0.47) (1.32) (0.64) (1.32) 
Remuneration committee chair = women -0.253** -0.0397 -0.251* -0.0351 
 (-2.14) (-1.20) (-1.85) (-1.00) 
Log total CEO pay 0.300*** 0.0656*** 0.318*** 0.0588*** 
 (4.47) (3.58) (3.56) (3.07) 
Institutional ownership 0.463 0.0313 0.262 0.0300 
 (1.58) (0.50) (0.84) (0.45) 
Board size 0.00947 -0.00652 0.0235 -0.00405 
 (0.44) (-1.08) (0.92) (-0.67) 
Remuneration committee size -0.0199 0.000214 -0.0151 0.000282 
 (-0.47) (0.02) (-0.34) (0.03) 
Board independence 0.280 0.169 0.215 0.131 
 (0.67) (1.43) (0.47) (1.08) 
Remuneration committee independence -0.627* -0.0661 -0.259 -0.0420 
 (-1.66) (-0.68) (-0.63) (-0.42) 
CEO duality 0.100 0.0532* 0.123 0.0478 
 (0.74) (1.66) (0.82) (1.50) 
Log CEO tenure -0.0693* -0.00273 -0.0625 -0.00573 
 (-1.85) (-0.30) (-1.64) (-0.63) 
Log total sales 0.105*** -0.000543 0.107** -0.00290 
 (2.76) (-0.05) (2.45) (-0.24) 
Stock return -0.190** -0.00409 -0.114 -0.0283 
 (-2.05) (-0.10) (-1.35) (-1.06) 
ROA 0.473 -0.224 0.143 -0.259 
 (0.86) (-1.49) (0.24) (-1.61) 
MBV -0.00382 0.000674 -0.000712 0.000988 
 (-1.25) (0.78) (-0.19) (1.09) 
Leverage 0.514** 0.00766 0.330 0.00457 
 (2.02) (0.11) (1.21) (0.06) 
Price volatility  0.0150*** 0.00373*** 0.0166** 0.00313** 
 (2.91) (2.85) (2.32) (2.19) 
Post 2007   0.342** -0.0818 
   (2.46) (-1.47) 
Post 2010   0.279* 0.0762 
   (1.90) (0.79) 
Post 2011   -0.0581 -0.0275 
   (-0.36) (-0.29) 
Post 2013   0.0104 0.000405 
   (0.08) (0.01) 
Year dummies Yes Yes No No 
Constant -6.470*** -0.413** -8.113*** -0.298* 
 (-8.33) (-2.22) (-4.76) (-1.65) 
Hansen test (p value) 0.401 0.991 0.175 0.939 
AR1 (p value) -0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.000 
AR2 (p value) 0.644 0.639 -0.716 0.776 
Wald (F-test) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 2194 2216 2194 2216 
Note that all independent variables are treated as endogenous except year dummy variables. Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total 
number vote cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is 
greater than 10%, 0 otherwise. Women is proportion of women from total remuneration committee size. Women on board is proportion of women from total 
board size. Remuneration committee chairperson = woman is measured as an indicator of 1 if a woman is the chair of the remuneration committee, 0 
otherwise. Log CEO pay is sum of natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Institutional ownership 
is proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board 
independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the 
remuneration committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO 
duality dummy is 1 if CEO combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on 
board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price 
appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price 
volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and low from a mean price for each year. Post-2007 to control for the impact of the financial 
crisis. Post-2010 to control for the impact of the UK Stewardship Code. Post-2011 to control for the impact of the UK Davies Report. Post-2013 to control 
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Table 8 Critical mass of women directors on the remuneration committee and the 
impact on shareholders’ dissent voting using two-step GMM 
 Model (1) Model (2) 
 System GMM System GMM 
 Log dissent Dissent>10 % 
Lag Log dissent 0.0827  
 (0.49)  
Lag Dissent>10 %  0.131*** 
  (3.61) 
Women<20% 0.0622 0.0441 
 (0.29) (0.72) 
20<Women<30 -0.115 -0.00968 
 (-1.02) (-0.35) 
Women>30 % -0.537*** -0.108** 
 (-3.05) (-2.27) 
Women on boards 0.508 0.229 
 (0.73) (1.26) 
Remuneration committee chair = women -0.276** -0.0443 
 (-1.98) (-1.25) 
Log total CEO pay 0.326*** 0.0586*** 
 (3.67) (3.07) 
Institutional ownership 0.240 0.0235 
 (0.77) (0.36) 
Board size 0.0204 -0.00483 
 (0.81) (-0.80) 
Remuneration committee size 0.00875 0.00381 
 (0.18) (0.31) 
Board independence 0.166 0.108 
 (0.37) (0.89) 
Remuneration committee independence -0.206 -0.0280 
 (-0.50) (-0.28) 
CEO duality 0.145 0.0514 
 (0.97) (1.64) 
Log CEO tenure -0.0632* -0.00598 
 (-1.67) (-0.65) 
Log total sales 0.107** -0.00316 
 (2.42) (-0.27) 
Stock return -0.118 -0.0285 
 (-1.39) (-1.06) 
ROA 0.153 -0.253 
 (0.25) (-1.58) 
MBV -0.000406 0.00106 
 (-0.11) (1.16) 
Leverage 0.342 0.0123 
 (1.25) (0.17) 
Price volatility  0.0179** 0.00336** 
 (2.47) (2.35) 
Post 2007 0.331** -0.0747 
 (2.39) (-1.32) 
Post 2010 0.275* 0.0796 
 (1.87) (0.83) 
Post 2011 -0.0485 -0.0259 
 (-0.30) (-0.27) 
Post 2013 0.0180 -0.000679 
 (0.14) (-0.01) 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
Constant -8.369*** -0.322* 
 (-4.86) (-1.78) 
Hansen test (p value) 0.333 0.998 
AR1 (p value) -0.001 -0.000 
AR2 (p value) 0.812 -0.632 
Wald (F-test) 0.000 0.000 
N 2194 2216 
Note that all independent variables are treated as endogenous except year dummy variables. Log dissent is total number of against votes divided by total number vote 
cast on remuneration report (transferred using logit dissent = ln(dissent/(1-dissent)). Dissent >10% is an indicator of 1 if shareholders’ dissent is greater than 10%, 0 
otherwise. Women<20 % is an indicator variable of 1 if the remuneration committee has at least one woman up to 20% women, 0 otherwise. 20%<Women<30% is an 
indicator variable of 1 if a remuneration committee has a proportion of women in the remuneration committee that is more than 20% up to 30%, 0 otherwise. Women 
>30% is an indicator variable of 1 if the proportion of women on the remuneration committee is more than 30%, 0 otherwise.  Women on board is proportion of 
women from total board size. Remuneration committee chairperson = woman is measured as an indicator of 1 if a woman is the chair of the remuneration committee, 
0 otherwise. Log CEO pay is sum of natural logarithm of CEO total remuneration, which include cash, and equity linked remuneration. Institutional ownership is 
proportion of ownership hold by institutional investors holding more than 3% of firm’s equity. Board size is total number of directors in the board. Board 
independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in the board. Remuneration committee size is total number of directors in the remuneration 
committee. Remuneration committee independence is proportion of independent nonexecutive directors in remuneration committee. CEO duality dummy is 1 if CEO 
combine the posts of CEO and chair, 0 otherwise. Log CEO tenure is natural logarithm of number of years a CEO serve on board. Log sales is natural log of firms’ 
total sales. ROA is firms’ income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. Stock returns is stock price appreciation plus dividends. MBV is average equity 
market value divided by total book value of equity. Leverage is the total debt to total assets. Price volatility is a stock's average annual price movement to a high and 
low from a mean price for each year. Post-2007 to control for the impact of the financial crisis. Post-2010 to control for the impact of the UK Stewardship Code. Post-
2011 to control for the impact of the UK Davies Report. Post-2013 to control for the impact of the UK say-on-pay mandatory and binding voting. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses (at firm level)..*p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01 
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Table 9 The Average Treatment Effect (ATT) Results For Propensity Score Matching 
Models 
 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Log dissent ATT -3.69 -3.42 -0.271 0.118 -2.28** 
Dissent > 10%  ATT 0.152 0.204 -0.526 0.030 -1.75* 
The table presents the differences in Log dissent and Dissent > 10% based on propensity 
score estimates of remuneration committees with women vs remuneration committees 
without women. The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) measures the 






Table 10 Impact of women directors on the remuneration committee on say-on-pay 
dissent voting pre- and post-2011 and 2013 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 OLS Logit OLS Logit 
 Log dissent Dissent>10 Log dissent Dissent>10 
Panel A Pre-2011 Post-2011 
Women -0.695* -1.231* -0.774** -1.456** 
 (-1.75) (-1.69) (-2.27) (-2.15) 
Women on boards 0.314 0.849 -0.0867 -0.134 
 (0.41) (0.67) (-0.13) (-0.11) 
Remuneration committee 
chair = women 
-0.0527 0.348 -0.334** -0.460 
 (-0.33) (1.23) (-2.58) (-1.63) 
Constant  -8.730*** -5.526*** -10.30*** -9.218*** 
 (-10.47) (-3.53) (-11.39) (-5.28) 
N 1434 1443 971 976 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.142 0.060 0.158 0.086 
Panel B Pre-2013 Post-2013 
Women -0.881*** -1.525** -0.873** -1.676* 
 (-2.69) (-2.47) (-2.02) (-1.85) 
Women on boards 0.760 1.228 0.0782 -0.335 
 (1.27) (1.12) (0.09) (-0.19) 
Remuneration committee 
chair = women 
-0.0586 0.181 -0.229 -0.225 
 (-0.47) (0.78) (-1.36) (-0.61) 
Constant  -8.734*** -6.648*** -9.520*** -11.23*** 
 (-11.44) (-4.86) (-7.14) (-4.30) 
N 1692 1702 563 568 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.158 0.064 0.159 0.135 
See previous tables for variables definition. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix A Frequency Table 
 Freq. Percent Cum. 
Number women on remuneration committees 
0 1,510 51.47 51.47 
1 1,085 36.98 88.45 
2 304 10.36 98.81 
3 32 1.09 99.9 
4 3 0.1 100 
Total 2,934 100   
 Number women on boards  
0 1,133 38.62 38.62 
1 1,016 34.63 73.24 
2 543 18.51 91.75 
3 193 6.58 98.33 
4 39 1.33 99.66 
5 8 0.27 99.93 
6 2 0.07 100 
Total 2,934 100   
Remuneration committee size 
2 95 3.24 3.24 
3 1,032 35.17 38.41 
4 1,068 36.4 74.81 
5 517 17.62 92.43 
6 164 5.59 98.02 
7 37 1.26 99.28 
8 17 0.58 99.86 
9 4 0.14 100 
Total 2,934 100   
 
 
 
 
